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REGIONALIZATION STRATEGY:  THE CASE OF SINGAPORE’S GAMBIT IN VIETNAM1 
 
Caroline YEOH, Singapore Management University, Singapore 
Victor SIM, Singapore Management University, Singapore 
Wilfred HOW, Singapore Management University, Singapore 
 
 
 ABSTRACT 
 
Infrastructure can be unreliable and administration subject to corruption in Asia’s rapidly emerging 
economies. This context presented Singapore with unique opportunities to export its expertise to 
locations where these attributes are less certain, through the provision of superior infrastructure, the 
ability to negotiate investment concessions and, where existing, through the links to influential business 
groups in the investment location. This strategic initiative is further premised on the perception that 
Singapore’s positive reputation with multinationals, as well as ‘guanxi’, or connections, with Asian 
business networks, will give the industrial-township projects a marketing advantage. Their progress is a 
litmus test of Singapore’s ability to export its efficiency in industrial park development and management 
outside its borders.  Yeoh et al (2004)2 discusses the inaugural Singapore industrial township project – 
the Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) in Riau, Indonesia.  The Singapore government, using the BIP model, 
has developed a manufacturing enclave in another ASEAN neighbour – the Vietnam-Singapore Industrial 
Park (VSIP).  Our paper hence examines VSIP to evaluate the Singapore model in this different setting.  
Based on evidence presented from on-site interviews and surveys, we conclude that, similar to BIP, 
progress in this privileged investment zone remains stymied by particular dependencies in the host 
environment and, ten years on, the initial optimism with which this project was unveiled has not been 
justified. 
 
Keywords: Industrial Parks – Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Singapore’s regionalization strategy comprised state-led infrastructure projects, and a range of incentives 
and regulatory innovations designed to assist private companies and individuals move overseas. The 
program involved the establishment of industrial townships to create a ‘Singapore-styled’ business 
environment for Singapore-based companies to expand regionally. The Singapore government, in this 
instance, takes the initiative to develop regional sites as locations to access resources and markets. This 
strategic maneuver is premised on the perception that the redistribution of manufacturing activities to low-cost 
industrial sites will enhance the collective competitiveness of Singapore-based companies that redistribute 
their resource-dependent operations to these enclaves, as well as Singapore’s own competitiveness as a 
high-value investment location with strategic linkages to the region. Pari passu, Singapore lends its 
competitive strengths in industrial infrastructural development and management to these regional sites to 
enhance their competitiveness.  
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows: the next section outlines the raison d’etre for 
Singapore’s regionalization stratagem, followed by an update on, the progress of the case study park. 
The third section sets out the analytical framework for our empirical analyzes, details the research 
methodology and presents the results of our empirical surveys, which are reinforced by case studies 
culled from in-depth interviews on-site. The concluding sections section consider the issues and 
challenges, as well as the implications of these experiences, for Singapore’s regionalization program, and 
invariably the city-state’s ability to export its efficiency in industrial park development and management 
outside its borders.  
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2. SINGAPORE REGIONALIZATION STRATAGEM 
 
The city-state of Singapore has continually sought to overcome its resource limitations by extending its 
economic hinterland beyond its national boundaries. Singapore’s global outreach, supported by constant 
economic reform and its competitive strengths, has allowed it to achieve remarkable economic growth in 
a relatively short span of time. To fuel economic development, the city-state began to make deliberate 
efforts to woo foreign investors with low-labor costs in the mid-1960s (Mirza, 1986; Pang, 1987; Rodan, 
1989; Regnier, 1991; Huff, 1995; Pereira, 2000).This influx of investment remained the engine of growth 
until cheaper manufacturing locations that emerged in developing Asian countries eroded Singapore’s 
competitive edge. Subsequently, the government initiated a major industrial restructuring, which saw 
Singapore transforming itself into a hub for MNEs engaged in higher value-added manufacturing activities 
(Krause, 1987; Lim et al, 1988). By the late 1980s, Singapore boasted world-class infrastructure, an 
educated and highly skilled workforce and excellent business support.  
 
Singapore’s economic planners sought to expand the island's investment horizons through an overseas 
direct investment program launched in 19883.The main ideas were set out in the policy document, Gearing 
Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB), 1988). 
The 1990 Global Strategies Conference added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB, 1990). 
Capitalizing on the liberalization of foreign investment controls and high growth rates in the Asia-Pacific 
region, Singapore looked to develop its ‘external wing’ by investing in countries across Asia (Wong and 
Ng, 1991; Regnier, 1993; Mahizhnan, 1994; Murray and Pereira, 1995; Pang, 1995; Okposin, 1999; 
Blomqvist, 2002). Singapore’s regionalization program involved, amongst others4, the establishment of 
industrial parks in emerging economies in the Asian region which replicated the business environment 
found in Singapore (Perry and Yeoh, 2000; Yeoh et al., 2004a).The industrial parks were marketed as a 
propitious synergy of location-specific advantages and Singapore’s strengths in infrastructural 
development and management. These low-cost manufacturing enclaves were established, based on the 
premise that they would allow Singapore-based MNEs to maintain access to low-cost, resource-abundant 
centers for their resource-dependent operations, while conducting higher value-added operations in 
Singapore. Singapore’s regionalization program was intended to set in place a strategic configuration for the 
city-state to concentrate on higher value-added activities, and yet retain important linkages with production 
centers with low-cost environments. In effect, Singapore’s own environment for high-end operations, and 
its strategic links to low-cost centers in the region would then make it an attractive hub for global 
corporations. 
 
This strategic repositioning was discussed at the 1993 Regionalization Forum, and encapsulated in the 
policy document, Singapore Unlimited (SEDB, 1993a; 1995a; 1995b). This point was amplified by the 
Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993): 
 
‘… Other countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have invested overseas in 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam and China in a big way in the last 4-5 years. 
These investments will give their GNP an added boost. Mature economies like those of 
the US, Japan, France and Switzerland have this external dimension which broadens 
their domestic operations and helps upgrade their economy. For the same reasons, we 
must grow an external wing to our economy.’ 
 
The government’s role in the township developments was three-pronged. First, senior politicians and civil 
servants negotiated the institutional framework for the project, which typically involved garnering special 
investment conditions in the host location5. The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with business 
practice preferred by the linked communities of ‘overseas Chinese’ (Hamilton, 1991; East Asia Analytical 
Unit, 1995; Brown, 1998; Yeung, 2002), the ‘bamboo network’ which Singapore made use of in its 
industrial parks in Indonesia and China. Second, Singapore government agencies and government-linked 
companies (GLCs) were the prime investors in the infrastructure and real estate development, usually via 
a ‘government-selected’ consortium (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998). Third, senior politicians were 
aggressively involved in the marketing and promotion of the parks:  
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 ‘Companies can reduce their risks when venturing into Asia by linking up with local 
partners, and Singapore can help facilitate this process by acting as a ‘Partnership 
Centre’ to bring together strategic alliances for companies to invest in third countries in 
the East Asia region. … [We] can provide foreign companies with a convenient foothold 
through the industrial parks that are being built and managed by Singapore in China, 
India, Indonesia and Vietnam.’     
             - Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew 
(Cited in Asian Review of Business and Technology, 1996) 
  
As well, Singapore’s premier investment promotion agency, the Singapore Economic Development 
Board, took on the role of ‘business architect’ and ‘knowledge arbitrageur’ (SEDB, 1995a), by 
encouraging foreign multinationals to locate their regional headquarters in Singapore, whilst redistributing 
lower-end operations to the industrial parks. The SEDB controls access to a wide range of taxation 
concessions and regulatory permissions in Singapore, and has great influence over investors who 
perceive cooperation with the EDB may bring business advantages (Perry, 1995).  The government also 
initiated a series of platforms for strategic discussions and collaboration to market Singapore’s overseas 
industrial parks (SEDB, 1993b). The Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park, along with other similar parks in 
Indonesia, China and India, is an example of this mode of regionalization. 
 
 
3. VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK (VSIP) 
 
The Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park is Singapore’s flagship industrial-park project in Vietnam. First 
proposed in March 1994 by the then Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, and Singapore’s then 
Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, VSIP was officially launched in 1996. As with earlier projects, such as 
the Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) in Indonesia that was examined in Yeoh et al (2004), Singapore 
looked to ‘export’ and synergize its efficient infrastructure and management expertise with competitive 
cost structures arising from location-specific resources in another Asian environment. 
 
VSIP is located in Bin Duong Province, 17 km north of Ho Chi Minh City, and within a 40-minute drive 
from the international airport and seaports. The self-contained 1000-hectare park boasts a 
comprehensive suite of facilities such as prepared land plots, ready-built factories, and an on-site 
customs unit which allows for customs procedures and documentation to be done within the Park, as well 
as customs inspections within the tenant’s factories. Tenants also have access to a ready pool of low-cost 
labor from a 200,000 working population available within a 15-km radius. In addition, the Vietnam-
Singapore Technical Training Centre (VSTTC) provides skilled manpower. Established in 1998, VTTSC is 
an S$9.5 million three-way project between the Singapore and Vietnam governments and VSIP. For the 
first five years of VTTSC’s operations, VSIP was given priority for its graduates. These facilities are 
further complemented by Singapore management know-how and quality infrastructural support, allowing 
VSIP to offer convenient, ‘one-stop’ service to its tenants (VSIP Connection, various issues). 
 
In addition, to incorporate lesson learnt from its industrial park projects in China6 – hampered progress 
during their development phase due to uneven distribution of ownership and responsibility and insufficient 
identity of interest between the working parties on the ground – Singapore made deliberate efforts to 
foster strong collaboration with local authorities. VSIP is jointly developed by a Singapore consortium led 
by SembCorp Industries7 and Becamex, a Vietnamese state-owned enterprise. To pre-empt the 
perception that the VSIP was a partnership imposed upon by the central government, a Management 
Board, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Binh Duong Province People's Committee, was established at 
the inception of the park. The board, with representatives from the ministries of Trade, Finance and 
Interior, as well as the General Customs Department, oversees the issue of investment licenses, 
import/export permits, and construction permits 
 
SEDB’s role in promoting VSIP has been pivotal. Prior to the launch of VSIP in May 1995, a total of 13 
international companies with investments worth US$80 million reportedly indicated their interest in the 
Park. Several companies acknowledged the SEDB’s efforts in marketing the Park and, in facilitating their 
set-up process. The pioneer tenants included 3M, Sandoz, Sakata Inx, Godrej (India), Liwayway Food 
Industries (Philippines), and a mix of Singapore manufacturers like ST Automotive, Star Chemicals and 
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Hwa Hup. The difficult environment post-1997, notwithstanding, cumulative investment commitments in 
VSIP exceeded US$350 million within the first three years from its launch. By 1998, investments from the 
30 tenants in VSIP amounted to US$370 million. In the following year, VSIP saw an increase of tenants to 
33, with aggregate investment exceeding US$400 million. Then, VSIP had tenants from 10 different 
countries, investing in a wide range of industries, including food, electrical and electronics, 
pharmaceuticals and healthcare, specialty materials, consumer goods and light industries. Today, over 
US$600 million has reportedly been invested in the development of VSIP, while investment commitments 
by the Park’s tenants are currently valued in excess of US$1 billion. As at May 2004, VSIP has 138 
committed tenants from 21 countries, of which 80 are already operational. 26,000 jobs have been 
created, with the number expected to rise to 40,000 when the rest of the tenants start their operations 
(Table 1). The Park posted its first profits of US$4 million in 2002. Net profit for 2003 stood at US$4 
million, and is likely to exceed US$6million in 2004. 
 
VSIP has a list of priority industries, which adheres closely to the official list of preferred industries8. 
However, VSIP is less selective in its tenant profile, as can be observed from the diverse mix of tenants. 
This is in marked contrast to the Indonesian parks, where the focus on electronics and other light 
industries complements the restructuring of Singapore’s manufacturing sector. VSIP’s sector mix ranges 
from electronics to light industries to pharmaceuticals (Table 2), while the tenant mix reflects the 
importance of Asian MNEs (Table 3). Singaporean and non-Asian companies are represented in a broad 
swathe of industries, in a broad swathe of industries - food, electrical and electronics, pharmaceuticals 
and healthcare, specialty materials, consumer goods and light industries, while the Japanese companies 
are largely concentrated in electronics. VSIP’s major tenants include Konica, Nitto Denko, Kimberly-Clark, 
Diethelm and Roche. Table 1 gives VSIP’s operational statistics, while Table 2 and 3 give the tenant 
profile by sector and country of origin respectively.  
 
TABLE 1: VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
OPERATIONAL STATISTICS 
 
General Information 
 
Investment by Developer 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up 
Investment by Tenants 
Annual Export Value (for 2002) 
No. of Employees 
 
 
US$600 million 
138 
300 hectares 
> US$1 billion 
> US$2 billion 
26,000 
 
 
Source: Compiled from VSIP Fact Sheet, May 2004. 
 
 
TABLE 2: VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
TENANT PROFILE BY SECTOR 
 
Sector Percent Sector Percent 
Electronics 11 Consumer goods 14 
Food 9 Logistics 14 
Light industries 20 Parts and components 10 
Pharmaceuticals 9 Others 13 
 
Source: SembParks Management (Private) Limited. 
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TABLE 3: VIETNAM-SINGAPORE INDUSTRIAL PARK 
TENANT PROFILE BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN 
 
Country Percent 
Singapore 24 
Japan 21 
Taiwan 17 
Other Asian Countries 22 
US and Europe 16 
 
Source: SembParks Management (Private) Limited. 
 
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
4.1 Analytical Framework 
Dunning’s eclectic paradigm proffered an analytical framework to examine the pattern and extent of 
activities of firms engaged in value-added activities beyond their national boundaries (Dunning 1980, 
1988, 2001). It sought to explain the ability and willingness of firms to serve markets and delve into the 
reasons behind their choice of exploiting this advantage through foreign production rather than domestic 
production, exports or portfolio resource flows. The eclectic paradigm postulates that foreign investment 
will only occur if it is advantageous to combine spatially transferable intermediate products produced in 
the home country, with at least some immobile factor endowments or other intermediate products in 
another country. Specifically, the configuration of ownership-specific advantages, internalization-incentive 
advantages, and location-specific advantages (OLI) determines international production and its nature.  
 
The framework goes on to assert that the import of each advantage in the OLI triumvirate and the 
relationship between them varies across firms, industries and countries and is context-specific. More 
recent literature has widened the ambit of the eclectic paradigm to include deliberations on the role of 
infrastructure in the attraction of new investments (Peck, 1996); the location tournaments for foreign 
investments (Lundan 2003); the presence of immobile clusters of complementary value-added activities 
(Markusen, 1996; Porter, 1998); the agglomeration economies of spatial proximity (Krugman, 1998; 
Porter, 1996); and the business-government nexus in alliance capitalism (Dunning 1995, 1997; Dunning 
and Narula, 1996).  
 
From firms’ perspective, Porter (1994, 1996, 2000), among others, has argued that not only should the 
production process be viewed as a value chain, but also that firms should identify comparative or 
location-specific advantages unique to each country/territory, which will serve to complement the 
competitive and firm-specific advantages specific to their core functions. Furthermore, according to 
rationalization theories, firms should situate their operations in different locations to capitalize on the 
comparative advantages offered in each location.  
 
In addition, Dunning (1998) has reiterated the importance of created location-advantages in the new 
economics of competition. As created assets supersede natural factor endowments as a key determinant 
of location, the roles of governments in advancing the competitiveness of a country or region within a 
country need to be altered accordingly. Inter alia, governments need to ensure that availability, quality 
and cost effectiveness of general purpose inputs match up to the standards of their global competitors, 
create and sustain an institutional framework and ethos that facilitates a continuous upgrading of the 
resources and capabilities within its jurisdiction and facilitate, rather than impede micro-regional clusters 
development and upgrading (Dunning, 1995, 1997a, 1997b; Stopford, 1999, Porter 1998, 2000). 
Singapore’s involvement in VSIP and corollary partnership with the Vietnamese government and state-
owned enterprises represents an effort to synergize superior infrastructure and efficient and transparent 
management practices, with the location-specific advantages of Vietnam. The underlying intention is to 
create an enclave, within a more uncertain environment, where firms can exploit location-specific 
advantages with greater ease and security. 
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VSIP aims to provide location-specific advantages for firms with manufacturing operations, particularly 
those that look to gain easier access to the Vietnamese and neighboring markets. The Park offers 
abundant unskilled labor and other local resources at low cost, and proximity to target markets. These 
pull factors are enhanced and strengthened by world-class infrastructure within the park, strong 
commitment and support from the local authorities and growing bilateral economic cooperation between 
Singapore and Vietnam. The envisaged product of this combination is an industrial park, distinct amidst 
the competition, which presents itself as attractive investment enclave. 
 
 
4.2 Research Methodology 
To obtain primary data on the differential impact of various pull/push factors on the location-decisions of 
firms in VSIP, we applied a modified version of the survey questionnaire developed in Yeoh, et al (2000) 
to the tenants in the park. The questionnaire survey focused on three main areas. Firstly, the profile of the 
respondents: type of ownership, nature of operations, establishment size (number of employees), sales 
turnover and market orientation; the second section was structured to gauge the differential impact of 
various push/pull factors on firms’ decision to locate in the case-study park. Data on various constraints 
were gathered in the third section. Other questions pertaining to the respondents’ views on the facilities 
and services in the Parks were culled from open-ended questions. As well, in-depth case studies of 
selected VSIP tenants were conducted for a firm-level analysis. The fieldwork was conducted between 
December 2003 and July 2004. This section presents our survey results.  
 
4.3 Questionnaire Survey 
 
4.3.1 Profile of respondents 
We interviewed 47 companies in VSIP, which represented 34 percent of the committed tenants in VSIP at 
the time of the interview. The interviewees were all senior managers at the facilities. Of the 47 
respondents, 10 were wholly Singapore-owned, 2 were joint-ventures and 35 were wholly foreign-owned. 
There were 29 small firms, 9 medium-sized firms, and 9 large firms. As for their nature of operations, 20 
manufactured consumer products, 12 manufactured intermediate products, 3 were involved in industrial 
services, 1 company manufactured capital goods and the rest involved in other operations. In terms of 
market orientation, 19 respondent-companies targeted the domestic (Vietnam) market, 18 exported 
mainly to the other ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) economies, while Japan was the 
primary market for 10 of the companies interviewed. None of the respondents exported to the Chinese or 
South Korean markets.  
 
4.3.2 Statistical Treatment of Survey Results 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the responses relating to factors 
and constraints, a logit model was applied to compare the push/pull factors influencing the tenants’ 
decision to locate in VSIP and the constraints they encountered. With the aim of examining the 
attractiveness of the Singapore style infrastructure as well as its suitability to the operation of MNCs,  
foreign firms are compare to Singaporean firms, pertaining to the push and pull factors affecting them to 
locate in VSIP. As the operational needs of large firms can be significantly different from those small and 
medium firms, also most of the foreign firms located in VSIP are large firms, the size of the firms are thus 
taken as another variable; particularly comparing large firms to small and medium firms.  The (cumulative) 
logistic distribution function, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the following form: 
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Pi = exp(Zi) / [ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
 
where:   Pi is the probability of firm i choosing the factor in question, 
            exp refers to the exponentiation operator and 
    Zi is a linear function of the firm attributes9 defined as: 
   
 Zi = α0 + α1F + α2 L 
 
where:   F = 1 if wholly foreign-owned, 0 otherwise 
             L = 1 if large (> 500 employees), 0 otherwise 
        α0 = constant term 
                      αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
  
Hence, if the estimated coefficients in the logit model is statistically significant (as indicated by the z- 
statistics and p-values), this would imply that the probability of a firm (e.g. foreign-owned) choosing a 
particular factor is greater than the probability of another firm (of different ownership type) making the 
choice, after taking into consideration the size of the firms. 
 
4.3.3 Factors Influencing Respondents’ Decision to Invest in VSIP (Tables 4 and 5) 
Singapore leverages on its infrastructure development expertise and the low-cost labor available in the 
host environments to market its industrial parks. It supplements these purported advantages with its 
political commitment to the parks, as demonstrated by the many bilateral agreements between 
Singapore’s government agencies, and government-linked companies, with the host governments (or, 
political-linked business conglomerates, as in the case of Indonesia). 
 
Interestingly, political commitment from the Singapore government was not a major pull factor for most of 
the respondents. Only 9 cited it as a main pull factor of VSIP, in marked contrast to our earlier studies on 
the Singapore-styled parks in Indonesia (Yeoh et al., 2004b) where political commitment from the 
Singapore government to the projects ranked among the top priorities of most of the respondents. 
Tellingly, political commitment from the Vietnamese government was the most frequently cited pull factor, 
and was highlighted by 80% of the respondents. The corollary is that this is a reflection of the 
respondents’ concerns over Vietnam’s political-economic environment, and the impact on their 
operations.  
 
Not unexpectedly, the reliable and efficient Singapore-styled infrastructure was the Park’s other draw, 
with 77% of the respondents citing it as a significant pull factor on their decision to locate in VSIP. As well, 
64% of the respondents mentioned availability of investment incentives as a significant pull factor. Other 
frequently cited factors included access to domestic markets, competitive labor costs, access to overseas 
markets, and availability of skilled/educated labour. These factors were highlighted by 47%, 43%, 32% 
and 26% of respondents respectively, underlining the location-specific advantages offered to firms by 
VSIP.  
 
Statistically, we did not detect any significant difference between wholly-owned foreign firms, and the 
Singaporean-owned and joint venture firms, in their emphasis on VSIP’s Singapore-styled infrastructure. 
However, their view on competitive labor costs was decidedly different.  Compared to Singaporean-
owned firms and join ventures, the foreign firms were less likely to highlight competitive labor costs as a 
main pull factor on their decision to locate in VSIP, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant 
α1 (= -1.938). Rather, the foreign firms were more likely to choose access to overseas markets as the 
main pull factor, compared to Singapore-owned firms and joined ventures, as suggested by the positive 
and statistically significant α1 (= 2.058). Large firms, as compared to small and medium-sized firms, were 
also more likely to chose access to overseas markets as the main pull factor of VSIP, as indicated by the 
positive and statistically significant α2 (= 1.338).  Taken together, it can be argued that easy accessibility 
to overseas markets was a key determinant in the location choice of the foreign firms, while Singapore-
owned firms in the Park were more inclined to focus on cost considerations.  
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Large firms are also more likely to consider competitive overhead as a main pull factor for them to locate 
in VSIP, as compared to small and medium-sized firms, as indicated by the positive and statistically 
significant α2 (= 1.807). A plausible explanation is that the smaller firms are more ‘nimble’ in their scale 
and scope of operations, whereas the technological sophistication of the operations of the larger firms, as 
well as their need for experienced management teams, translate into committed overhead costs. As such, 
it is not surprising that the larger firms were more sensitive to this location-specific factor. 
 
TABLE 4: 
FACTORS INFLUENCING RESPONDENTS’ DECISIONS TO INVEST IN VSIP  
(BY POPULAR RANKING) 
 
Factors Frequency Rank 
Political Commitment (Singapore government) 6 9 
Political Commitment (Vietnam government) 37 1 
Infrastructure Facilities & Support Services (VSIP) 36 2 
Investment incentives 30 3 
Human Resource-Avail. skilled/educated labor 12 7 
Human Resource-Competitive labor costs 20 5 
Physical Resource-Competitive overheads 6 9 
Access to overseas market 15 6 
Access to domestic market 22 4 
Presence of major buyers 11 8 
Presence of major suppliers 4 11 
Presence of major competitors 1 12 
 
   Source: On-site Interviews. 
 
 
TABLE 5: 
 FACTORS INFLUENCING RESPONDENTS’ DECISIONS TO INVEST IN VSIP  
(BY MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES - BINARY LOGIT) 
 
Push/Pull Factors α1(Foreign) α2(Large) 
-0.405 -19.512 Political commitment (Singapore government) (0.672) (0.999)
0.325 -0.812 Political commitment (Vietnam government) (0.684) (0.325)
0.091 1.046 Infrastructure Facilities & Support Services (VSIP) (0.907) (0.352)
-1.333 -1.011 Investment incentives 0.122 0.197
1.634 1.118 Human Resource-Avail. Skilled/educated labor 0.145 0.168 
-1.938 -1.266 Human Resource-Competitive labor costs 0.014** 0.182
-0.573 1.807 Physical Resource-Competitive overheads 0.566 0.055*** 
2.058 1.338 Access to overseas market 0.068 *** 0.106 *** 
-1.096 -0.078 Access to domestic market 0.119 0.919
-0.115 -0.078 Presence of major buyers 0.882 0.930
0.017 0.377 Presence of major suppliers 0.989 0.758
17.669 -17.579 Presence of major competitors 0.999 0.999 
 
  Source: On-site Interviews. 
 
Note:   * Significant at 1% level 
 ** Significant at 5% level                            
*** Significant at 10% level 
     n.c. non-convergence 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
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4.3.4 Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations in VSIP (Tables 6 and 7) 
VSIP is now an established industrial estate development, but our study alludes to emerging constraints 
which have undermined the attractiveness of the Park. These constraints are categorized into three broad 
groups, namely, those relating to labor, those relating to organization and technology, and those relating 
to the “environment” (e.g. government policies / regulations). 
 
72% of the respondents identified shortages of professionals and managers as the major constraint on 
their VSIP operations. Another frequently cited labor-related constraint was the shortage of semi-skilled or 
skilled labor (53%), an indication that VSTTC graduates may not yet be equipped with the relevant skill-
sets sought by tenants. Surprisingly, not many VSIP respondents complained about high and/or rising 
labour costs, with only 6 respondents citing this as a push factor. This result is in marked contrast to our 
studies on the other Singapore-styled industrial parks in Indonesia and China, indicating that the location-
specific advantage of ‘competitive’ labour costs proffered by VSIP remains very much a reality. However, 
a positive and statistically significant α2 (= 2.666) suggests that the larger firms were more likely to be 
perturbed by this constraint compared to the smaller ones. 
 
The Singapore-styled infrastructure, though reliable and efficient, also proved to be costly. The most 
frequently cited organization/technology-related constraint faced by the respondents was high and/or 
rising overhead costs. Difficulties in sourcing raw materials and lack of good supporting services were 
similarly 38% and 34% of the respondents respectively. Significantly, almost 50% of the respondents 
cited ‘impact of government policies/regulations’ as a major problem confronting their operations in VSIP, 
suggesting that the host government’s control over the operating environment, has proved stifling. As 
well, almost 50% of the respondents highlighted ‘competition from overseas competitors’, and the 
economic landscape shaped by overseas industry competitors, as particularly challenging to their VSIP 
operations.  
 
TABLE 6: 
CONSTRAINTS ON RESPONDENTS’ OPERATIONS IN VSIP 
    (BY POPULAR RANKING) 
 
Factors Frequency Rank 
Labor-related Constraints 
Shortage of semi-skilled/skilled labor 25 2 
Shortage of professionals & managers 34 1 
Rising labor costs 6 11 
Low labor productivity 11 8 
High absenteeism 6 11 
Industrial relations problems 6 11 
Organizational/Technological-related Constraints 
Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment 9 9 
Difficulty in sourcing raw materials 18 5 
Difficulty in introducing new technology & techniques 8 10 
Difficulty in securing funds for expansion 5 14 
Lack of good supporting services 16 7 
High/rising overhead costs 18 5 
‘Environmental’-related Constraints 
Government regulation 22 3 
Competition from overseas competitors 22 3 
 
   Source: On-site Interviews. 
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TABLE 7: 
CONSTRAINTS ON RESPONDENTS’ OPERATIONS IN VSIP 
(BY MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES - BINARY LOGIT) 
 
Constraints α1(Foreign) α2(Large) 
Labor-related Constraints 
0.645 -0.469 Shortage of semi-skilled & skilled labor 0.344 0.534 
-0.171 -0.330 Shortage of professionals and managers 0.823 0.679 
0.602 2.666 Rising labor cost 0.635 0.007 *    
-0.143 0.635 Low labor productivity 0.856 0.435 
0.581 0.872 High absenteeism 0.616 0.366 
0.613 -0.216 Industrial relations problems 0.594 0.854 
Organizational/Technological-related Constraints 
1.281 -20.081 Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment 0.259 0.999 
0.324 -0.951 Difficulty in sourcing raw material 0.649 0.274 
1.000 1.185 Difficulties in introducing new technology and 
implementing new techniques 0.382 0.171  
0.024 0.549 Lack of good supporting services 0.973 0.468 
0.309 1.194 Difficulty in securing funds for expansion 0.795 0.234 
-0.227 0.888 High or rising overhead 0.744 0.239 
‘Environmental’-related Constraints 
-0.168 -0.111 Impact of government regulations 0.802 0.882 
0.284 -0.130 Competition from overseas competitors 0.675 0.862 
 
   Source: On-site Interviews. 
 
Note:   * Significant at 1% level 
 ** Significant at 5% level                       
 *** Significant at 10% level 
     n.c. Non-convergence 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
 
 
4.4 Case Studies 
To add empirical rigor to our study, we present case studies of five companies in VSIP. This segment of 
our research is designed to delve into the dynamics of the tenants’ decisions to locate in VSIP, as well as 
to examine, from a firm-level perspective, the strategic advantage proffered to VSIP’s tenant-firms in 
differentiating the value-chain activities, capturing economies of scale and lowering costs via a spatial 
specialization of production into VSIP. 
 
4.4.1 Case A – Chemicals and Related Products 
Based in the United States, Company A is a global leader in the development and production of 
adhesives, specialty synthetic polymers for electronic materials, and industrial starches. It places strong 
emphasis on research and development and produces many patented products.  
 
Amongst an international network of 125 manufacturing facilities, Company A’s facility in VSIP is relatively 
small and has less than 50 employees. This operation allows for proximity to the Vietnam market, as well 
as Laos and Cambodia, thereby overcoming the high costs and difficulties that come with transporting 
industrial adhesives over large distances. Geographical proximity also facilitates communication between 
Company A and its customers so that products can be customized to the latter’s needs.     
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One of the most crucial factors for the company’s decision to locate in VSIP is its promise of stable power 
supply, which is imperative for the production of industrial adhesives. The one-stop service provided by 
VSIP, including the in-site customs, further enhanced this advantage.  
 
Recent competition from local companies producing inferior, but cheaper adhesives has forced Company 
A to relinquish some of its lower-value products and focus on more sophisticated ones which cannot be 
easily replicated. Consequently, rising overheads have emerged as a constraint on Company A’s 
operations in VSIP.  
 
Labor conditions also pose likely constraints. Although Vietnam offers a pool of educated labor force that 
can be readily trained to operate the machinery in the company, labor costs are showing a tendency to 
rise, and shortage of managers, professionals as well as research and development personnel may 
hamper its expansion plans. 
 
 
4.4.2 Case B – Pharmaceuticals 
Company B is a wholly Indian-owned pharmaceutical manufacturer in VSIP. Recognizing the immense 
potential and minimal competition in the Vietnam market, the company entered Vietnam in the early 
1990s. Company B began operations in VSIP in 1999 and currently has fewer than 50 employees. 
 
Apart from access to the domestic market, the company selected VSIP because of the world-class 
infrastructure provided by the ‘Singapore-styled’ park, such as water supply that met international 
standards. Furthermore, operating from VSIP allows the company to bypass the regulatory barriers it 
faced previously. It can now import machinery and raw materials like chemicals with greater ease. The 
company also cites the proactive park administration which has helped solve multiple problems, including 
recruitment of skilled personnel, as a pull factor. 
 
On the other hand, Company B does face constraints in production. First, it experiences delays due to 
difficulties in obtaining various licenses, permits and inspections before production can commence. This 
may be partly due to the nature of their products. The main problem Company B faces is labor-related. 
While there is an abundant pool of low-cost low-skilled labor, there is a shortage of skilled personnel. To 
increase the level of training for its employees and also circumvent the lack of training facilities for 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, the company regularly flies in skilled technicians from India to provide 
training for the operation of technologically advanced machines. Consequently, the company has been 
forced to pay wages that are even higher than that in India and is likely to continue with a small 
workforce. 
 
 
4.4.3 Case C – Electronics 
Based in France, Company C is a leading electrical equipment manufacturer serving clients from the field 
of energy, industry, infrastructure and construction. It has over 70,000 staff in 130 countries over 5 
continents. Currently, it has three operations in Vietnam, representative offices in Ho Chi Minh City and 
Hanoi, and the manufacturing facility in VSIP. The company hopes to participate in local contracts and 
projects through its domestic presence.  
 
Company C established operations in VSIP in 1999. Since then, it has maintained a small facility with less 
than 50 employees. The operations in Vietnam target mainly the domestic market, with some exports to 
the rest of the ASEAN. While low-skilled labor is readily available at low cost in Vietnam, managerial 
professionals, as well as research and development personnel are scarce. This made the company’s 
efforts to expand existing operations through increasing product offerings, above the current range of 
switchgears to circuit breakers, more difficult. VSIP was able to improve this situation somewhat, by 
providing graduates from VSTTC. These graduates are generally preferred to others because they are 
better trained. The extensive use of Vietnamese also poses a constraint for Company C. As changes in 
government policies are made in Vietnamese, the company finds it difficult to relate them to current 
business operations. This language barrier compounds the perception that government policies are 
relatively unfriendly to foreigners. 
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Despite these issues and the premium charged by VSIP, the company is considering expanding its 
facilities. This is largely due to the high sunk costs incurred thus far, which make moving to another 
location too costly.  
 
 
4.4.4 Case D – Paper Products 
Company D is a wholly Singapore-owned firm, with its parent company publicly listed in Singapore. The 
company manufactures paper products and has five factories in Vietnam, one of which is located in VSIP. 
The factories are strategically located across Vietnam to reduce transport costs and improve the 
company’s distribution network. Together, the five manufacturing facilities allow the company to capture 
about 30% of the local market. 
 
The decision to locate in VSIP was based on the park’s Singapore connection, as well as its proximity to 
Ho Chi Minh City, where Company D’s marketing operations are situated. The VSIP operation employs 
over 100 employees and targets mainly the domestic market. Only about 30% of the products are 
exported, mostly to ASEAN.  World-class and reliable infrastructure, including stable power facilities was 
a major pull factor for Company D.  
 
On the other hand, the company has experienced disruptions in power supply that proved to be quite 
costly. In response, it requested installing its own backup generators but was rejected. As such, what was 
initially a key pull factor has become a major constraint. In addition to unstable power supply, the 
company also faced difficulties in importing the machinery required for its operations, particularly older 
machines. As the production process is fairly automated, the company requires skilled workers to operate 
the machines. Despite paying above market rates of US$30, there is still a shortage of such skilled 
workers, and there is a trend towards high labor turnover rate. 
 
 
4.4.5 Case E – Snack Foods 
Company E is a leading snack food manufacturer based in the Philippines. With a workforce of 600, the 
company engages in manufacturing and product development within its VSIP operations. The company 
also has an administrative and marketing operation in Ho Chi Minh City. 
 
Unlike other investors, Company E was not deterred by the unstable political environment when it 
decided to invest in 1996, mainly due to its prior experience with infrastructural problems faced by 
emerging economies. Furthermore, these problems were somewhat alleviated by VSIP’s more reliable 
and quality infrastructure. 
 
Company E’s operations can be considered one of the more successful in VSIP. The company turned a 
profit within its first year of operations, and currently has an annual turnover of over US$10 million. The 
operations in VSIP mainly serve the local market, with some exports to the Middle East, as well as to the 
rest of ASEAN. Partially completed products are also exported back to the Philippines. 
 
Being one of the first-movers to enter the Vietnam snack food industry, the company has become the 
dominant snack food producer after successfully acquiring market share from small, inefficient domestic 
competitors. The company’s success in garnering domestic market share in Vietnam is attributed to the 
efficient production methods, as well as its good relationships with distributors. Although the Vietnamese 
market is comparatively younger, Company E’s Vietnam operations have proved to be more profitable 
than its operations in its home-market. This is attributed to the low labor costs, which is approximately half 
of that in the Philippines and, interestingly, the denomination of the currency, which allows the company 
to charge a higher price for some of its products in Vietnam.  
 
Unlike some other tenants in VSIP, the company does not face serious industrial relations issues, despite 
its large number of employees. Instead, problems such as transportation difficulties are resultant of poor 
conditions outside VSIP.  
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5. DISCUSSION 
 
Like the inaugural flagship projects in Riau, Indonesia, VSIP was marketed as a low-cost manufacturing 
enclave, supported by excellent, ‘Singapore-styled’ infrastructure and management expertise. This 
synergistic combination of factors has proved to be a significant determinant in firms’ choice of location. 
Furthermore, our findings also reveal that the ‘created’ location advantages are more crucial to small and 
medium-sized firms, compared to large firms, owing to their comparatively fewer resources and less 
extensive networks. While our research shows that the respondent-companies did choose to locate their 
operations in VSIP because they were attracted to the purported advantages, our findings also allude to 
concerns that these supposed advantages have not always been a reality. Furthermore, the Park’s 
limitations have restricted expansion and diversification of certain types of operations.  
 
For instance, our study suggests that VSIP has limitations in meeting its tenant’s needs. As reflected in 
the survey and by most of the case-study companies, there is a shortage of manpower equipped with a 
higher set of skills. Although unskilled labor is in abundance at low-cost, professionals and skilled workers 
required for sophisticated manufacturing operations or research and development are scarce. The 
VSTTC, though providing a trained labor pool, only offered fixed skill-sets that failed to cater to the 
diverse needs of the tenants. As such, many tenants have been forced to either incur higher costs to train 
locals and hire skilled professionals at a premium, or face voids in positions requiring labor expertise. For 
some tenants, this bottleneck has constrained their plans to expand their operations to include activities 
higher up in the value chain, resulting in the tendency for smaller operations for companies engaged in 
high-end manufacturing. As well, our study points to VSIP’s limitations in serving tenants from a spectrum 
of industries and, consequently, its failure to deliver efficient infrastructure and administration. For 
instance, Company B, a pharmaceutical, cited difficulties in obtaining permits, licenses and inspections as 
a constraint, hinting insufficient support for higher-end manufacturing. Company D, producing paper 
products, raised the issue of unstable power supply and the delay on the part of park administration to 
resolve the problem. As such, it is arguable that VSIP may not have lived up to its initial promise to 
provide reliable one-stop service within a self-contained environment. This shortcoming is exacerbated by 
tenants’ perception of rising overhead costs. 
 
Nevertheless, VSIP has managed to provide some purported location-specific advantages such as 
unskilled labor at competitive cost. It appears that VSIP is best suited for companies with labor-intensive 
operations, as they can tap into the vast pool of unskilled labor and rely less on expensive capital. This 
could explain the predominance of firms engaging in low value-added, labor-intensive activities in VSIP. 
In this respect, VSIP remains competitive and, with its ‘Singapore-styled’ facilities and amenities, 
continues to stand out from other locations. 
 
 
6. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
From our study, the consensus is that the localized, ‘superior’ infrastructure, the political commitment of 
the host government (more so than that proffered by the Singapore government), and the factor 
conditions were the main determinants that shaped the competitive environment in VSIP. The tenants 
were able to tap into the Singapore-styled environment, as well as leverage on Singapore’s infrastructure, 
management and expertise. These results lend support to rationalization theories, and affirm the 
agglomeration economies suggested by location theories.  
 
The Singapore-styled parks in Indonesia, India, China and Vietnam have secured a definitive edge over 
their competitors due to the many exclusive and unprecedented privileges accorded to them by host 
institutions. VSIP, for example, was allowed to construct its own telecommunication facilities and power 
and water treatment plants. This on-site suite of facilities was further enhanced by the involvement of 
local government officials serving on VSIP’s management board. They were instrumental in facilitating 
VSIP’s easy access to investment approvals, construction activities, import/export permits and 
immigration matters. Furthermore, Singapore and Vietnam’s robust bilateral economic ties, together with 
strategic partnerships between Singapore’s government-linked companies and their Vietnamese 
counterparts, secured special treatment for the Park. For example, VSIP was able to transcend much 
bureaucracy and upgrade the park surroundings. Amidst an uncertain host environment, VSIP gained a 
reputation as an exceptional investment enclave, boasting reliable infrastructure and special concessions 
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that facilitated establishment of operations. Nevertheless, a myriad of issues and challenges have 
thwarted VSIP from delivering the one-stop service and location-specific advantages it was designed to 
offer. 
 
 
6.1 Infrastructural ‘Dilemmas’ 
VSIP’s initial advantages of reliable infrastructure facilities were quickly eroded due to improvements in 
the host environment. For instance, the benefits of the Park’s independent power supply was negated by 
improvements in the erstwhile ‘unstable’ national grid; VSIP, in order to regain its competitiveness, had to 
offer tenants the choice between the cheaper national grid, and its more reliable power facility. Similarly, 
the advantages conferred by VSIP’s proximity to Ho Chi Minh City, as well as airports and seaports, were 
also eroded by improvements in the local transportation networks. Rather perplexing, the improvements 
in local infrastructural projects have translated into a plethora of miscellaneous fees, and added to 
operating costs of the Park’s tenants. This challenge is compounded by lack of transparency from local 
administrators, and corruption remains endemic. 
 
 
6.2 Market Realities 
VSIP’s attractiveness has been eroded by competition from newer industrial estates such as the Linh 
Trung Export Processing Zone, on top of incumbents like the Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone. 
Established by experienced and street-savvy developers from Taiwan, China and Thailand, these 
competitor parks market themselves aggressively on price, charging lower transportation fees accruing 
from more strategic locations. Heightened competition, exacerbated by rising overhead costs, has 
diminished the location-specific benefits that were supposed to give VSIP a definitive edge. In effect, the 
economics of heightened competition have called into question the premium attached to the ‘superior 
infrastructure’ in low-cost industrial-investment enclaves like VSIP. As well, the Park was launched at the 
same time as the mushrooming of industrial-township projects in other regional sites, notably Asia’s new 
powerhouse – China. VSIP struggles to maintain investor interest. 
 
 
6.3 Political ‘Patronage’   
On a broader front, reliance on political patronage (and personal ties) rather than transparent contracts 
has had advantages and disadvantages. Singapore’s optimism over the VSIP project was encouraged by 
a series of perceived advantages secured at the onset. These included VSIP being an initiative endorsed 
by both the central and local governments which, it was believed, translated into added security against 
political risks of investing in a Vietnam10, and the project was also accorded preferential policies in part 
due to its inter-government ties. In reality, the ‘special’ support from the local authorities has proved to be 
less significant than initially envisaged. Our on-site interviews point to negative undercurrents over 
Singapore’s control and management of VSIP. Anecdotal evidence suggests that local sentiments 
towards the Singapore partners were not unlike those expressed in the Suzhou-Wuxi experience in 
China, and these perception differences have translated into protracted conflicts and project delays, 
further compromising the competitiveness of VSIP. It is conceivable that the ownership-management 
structure of VSIP may, in time, be restructured to reflect a better alignment of interests. Significantly, 
Singapore’s SembCorp-led consortium has announced plans to divest itself of part of its stake in VSIP, 
even as the Park is finally registering positive returns on its investment. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
The Singapore model in Vietnam shares similar results as that in Riau, Indonesia.  Although the initial 
blueprints of VSIP as a privileged investment enclave in an uncertain context were promising, actual 
results have indicated their limitations and the early over-optimism over their outcome. While Singapore 
did successfully ‘export’ its expertise in infrastructure and administration, both ‘software’ and ‘hardware’ 
were subject to the social, political and economic environments in Vietnam. Given the shortage of skilled 
labor, endemic corruption and other limitations inherent in the host context, the maintenance of a world-
class facility proved costly. Furthermore, the Park has failed to provide an environment for tenants looking 
to expand their operations to include high value-added activities. As well, VSIP has to constantly seek 
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new methods to distinguish the park from competitor parks, even as a site best suited for labor-intensive, 
low-end manufacturing. However, as evidenced from the VSIP experience, the underlying assumption 
that an investment enclave can exist, relatively isolated from the conditions in the host environment is 
unrealistic. Regardless of the privileges it enjoys, VSIP’s success is to an extent dependent on 
uncontrollable external factors, as is her sister park in Indonesia. Thus far, an array of nuances that 
radiate from the host environment, and alluded to in this study, have stymied the progress of this 
privileged manufacturing enclave. 
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8. NOTES 
 
1
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2
 This paper seeks to add on to: Yeoh, C., Lim, D. and Kwan, A., “Regional Co-Operation and Low-Cost 
Investment Enclaves: An Empirical Study of Singapore’s Industrial Parks in Riau, Indonesia”, Journal Of 
Asia-Pacific Business, 2004, to ascertain the effectiveness of the Singapore model in Indonesia when 
applied to the Vietnamese economic setting. 
 
3
 This initiative initially sought to accelerate access to new technology, or foreign markets, by supporting 
Singapore companies to form joint ventures with overseas companies in Europe and North America. Most 
of these investments proved unsuccessful, resulting in enormous losses by the early 1990s 
(Balakrishnan, 1991). 
 
4
 The regionalization strategy had several thrusts, including the regional headquarters program (Perry, 
1995; Yeung, 2001) and the regionalization of Singapore’s indigenous enterprises (SEDB, 1995a, 1995b; 
Tan, 1995; Yeung, 1998), 
 
5
 Mechanisms include familiarization tours, formal and informal contacts amongst government officials, 
the constitution of ad-hoc problem-solving committees, and visits by ministerial delegations that 
emphasize the establishment of interpersonal relationships (Kumar and Siddique, 1994). 
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6
 There is now an extensive literature on the problems encountered in the China-Singapore Suzhou 
Industrial Park project (surveyed in Pereira, 2003); various news reports, for example, The Economist 
(January 3, 1998), The Straits Times (December 5, 1997; May 14, 1999; June 30, 1999); and an 
unpublished (confidential) report commissioned by the Singapore Government.  
 
7
 Other members of the consortium include Temasek Holdings, JTC International, UOL Overseas 
Investments, Salim’s KMP Group, LKN Construction, Sembawang Engineering and Mitsubishi 
Corporation (Source: http://www.sedb.com.sg). 
 
8
 Details are given in Circular No. 8, List of Encouraged, Limited and Prohibited Industries in Export 
Processing Zones and High-Technology Industrial Zones, issued on July 29, 1997. 
 
9 These attributes are dummy variables that take the value 1 if they are chosen and value 0 if they are not.  
 
10
 Bureaucratic red-tape and corruption remain endemic. Transparency International, a global counter-
corruption watchdog, ranks Vietnam as the second most corrupt country in South-East Asia (after 
Indonesia). The Vietnamese government itself recently estimated that light-fingered bureaucrats creamed 
off at least 20% of the infrastructure spending (The Economist, September 14, 2002).  
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